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Effectively Urbanized
Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar
Effectivement urbanisées. Les Yézidis des villes collectives de Sheikhan et Sinjar
Eva Savelsberg, Siamend Hajo et Irene Dulz
1 THE YEZIDIS, like the Shabaks, the Mandeans and the Christians of various confessions,
belong to the small religious minorities in Iraq.1 They are concentrated in northern
Iraq where, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, some 550,000 live –
about two-thirds in the district of Sinjar2 and most of the remaining third in the district
of Sheikhan.3 Both regions belong to the governorate of Nineveh and to the so-called
disputed territories which are claimed by Arabs as well as by Kurds. Both try to co-opt
the Yezidi community in order to gain power over the territories where this minority is
settled and in pursuing this goal they do not always refrain from violence.
2 However, this is not the first time in the past decades that the Yezidi community in
Sheikhan and Sinjar have faced severe challenges: from early 1975, under the regime of
Saddam Hussein, both 7 were confronted with village destruction, depopulation, and
deportation.  The indigenous Yezidis  (as  well  as  Muslim Kurds)  were deported from
their villages and resettled in so-called collective towns. At first, these were advertised
officially  as  “modernization  projects”,  serving  the  population  from  disadvantaged
villages by supplying them with electricity,  water,  and sanitation.  However, it  soon
became  obvious  that  the  forced  resettlement  of  the  Yezidi  population  was  not  a
development intervention, but a security project. The central government’s primary
goal was to prevent Yezidis from supporting the Kurdish National Movement led by
Mullah  Mustafa  Barzani  until  its  collapse  in  March  1975.4 The  collective  towns
supported this goal since they greatly facilitated control of the population [Dulz 2001:
54-55].5 In  other words,  forced displacement and forced urbanization went hand in
hand.
3 Indeed, the Yezidis of Sheikhan and Sinjar – originally a rural population – have been
effectively urbanized in the collective towns. Even though circumstances in Sinjar, in
particular,  are far from satisfactory in terms of security,  employment opportunities
and infrastructure, they did not, unlike many other Iraqi Kurds, migrate en masse to
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the urban centres of the Kurdistan Region. At the same time, there has not been a
significant  return  of  expelled  Yezidis  or  their  children  to  the  ancestral  villages.  It
appears,  rather,  that  a  considerable  number of  young,  predominantly  male  Yezidis
have been seeking asylum in European countries.
4 After briefly describing the main features of Yezidism and the historical relationship
between the Yezidi community and the Iraqi state, on the one hand, and Yezidis and
Muslim Kurds, on the other, this paper concentrates on the current situation in the
collective towns. What are the main reasons for the forced urbanization of the Yezidis?
Are  there  differences  between  Sheikhan  and  Sinjar?  And  what  exactly  does
urbanization  mean?  Is  this  term  suitable  in  order  to  describe  the  situation  of  the
Yezidis in the collectives?
5 Our paper attempts to give some preliminary answers to these questions – preliminary,
as there are neither reliable statistics available on the Yezidi collective towns, nor is it
currently possible, for security reasons, to conduct field research in Sinjar.6
 
Religious Beliefs and Caste System
6 Even though the majority of Yezidis – not only in Iraq – define themselves as Kurdish,
the relationship between Yezidis and Muslim Kurds is complicated.
7 The Peacock Angel, the highest of the seven angels ruling the world and a key figure of
piety  in  Yezidi  religion  is,  according  to  some  outside  interpretations,  identified  as
personification of the evil [Kreyenbroek 1995: 97]. Many Muslims view the Yezidis as
“devil-worshippers”. Moreover, and in comparison to Christianity and Islam, Yezidism
is  not  considered  a  religion  of  a  Holy  Book:  it  is  based  mainly  on  oral  tradition.
Therefore, Yezidis do not conform to the Muslim concept of protection. Finally, some
Muslims consider Yezidis not only as “Infidels”, but as apostates, Muslims who strayed
from the right path of Islam. Indeed, in the scientific literature it is widely accepted
that Sheikh Adi bin Musafir (born between 1073 and 1078 AD, died between 1160 and
1163 AD), the founder (respectively the reformer) of Yezidism, was an orthodox Sufi
sheikh. It is only under the leadership of Sheikh Hasan ibn Adi, nearly a hundred years
after Sheikh Adi bin Musafir’s death, that his followers increasingly began to turn away
from Islamic norms and integrate elements of pre-Islamic religions into their beliefs
[Kreyenbroek 1995: 97-98].7
8 Central for Yezidi society is a rigid caste system of religious character dividing Yezidis
in murids (laymen), pirs and sheikhs. In exchange for the religious services pirs and
sheikhs  offer  their  followers,  here  and  in  the  hereafter,  they  receive  alms.  Strict
endogamy not only prohibits conversion or marriage to a member of another religious
group  but  also  marriage  to  a  member  of  another  caste  [Guest  1987:  36;  Yalkut-
Breddermann 1991: 2.2.9].
9 Yezidism neither centres on individual prayer, nor does it know places analogous to
mosques or churches. Communal religious life is usually restricted to religious holidays
and the most important events in the human life  cycle:  birth,  marriage and death.
However, with the Valley of Lalesh, situated in Sheikhan, which hosts the shrine of
Sheikh Adi bin Musafir, the Yezidi community has an important religious centre where
yearly feasts and religious ceremonies are celebrated. Moreover, a great part of the
informal spiritual life in the Yezidi villages of Sheikhan and Sinjar centres around local
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shrines: small, whitewashed buildings with conical spires. They are dedicated to Yezidi
holy beings – such as the seven great angels or their earthly manifestations – or to local
Yezidi personalities. These shrines function mainly as “places of succour” for believers
facing some kind of difficulty, be it physical, psychological, or spiritual [Spät 2005: 34].
 
From Ottoman Times to the End of the Baath Regime
10 Historically,  the  Yezidi  community  has  remained  largely  secluded,  essentially  for
religious  reasons.  Stigmatized  as  devil  worshippers,  they  faced  waves  of  religious
persecution since Ottoman times. Under the reign of Badr al-Din in the first half of the
13th century, the followers of Sheikh Adi were slaughtered, Adi’s tomb in the Valley of
Lalesh  desecrated  and  his  bones  burnt.  Moreover,  widespread  anti-Yezidi  military
campaigns were carried out by Sunni Kurdish tribesmen in the same period. Towards
the end of the 19th century, the religious policies of the Ottoman government resulted
in large-scale persecution of the Yezidis. Many of them saw conversion to Christianity
as an alternative to Islamisation and conscription. After the First World War, British
mandatory rule, on the one hand, guaranteed some protection from persecution; yet,
on the other hand, it  contributed, as Nelida Fuccaro [1999] shows, to alienating the
Iraqi Yezidis from the emerging “Kurdish nation”.
11 Iraqi independence did not mark the end of Yezidi persecution, rather the opposite.
Under the Iraqi monarchy as well as the republican regime, Yezidis were discriminated
against  –  the  measures  applied  included  the  loss  of  land,  military  repression,  and
efforts  to  forcefully  enlist  them in  the  central  state’s  struggle  against  the  Kurdish
National Movement.8
12 The  Baath  party  under  Saddam  Hussein  took  this  policy  even  further:  from  the
mid-1970s onwards, a process of forced displacement was initiated. In Sinjar, in late
1974, the former Committee for Northern Affairs ordered the confiscation of property,
the  destruction  of  the  mostly  Yezidi  villages  and  the  forcibly  settlement  of  the
population in 11 collective towns with Arab names. Most of the 137 villages destroyed
were located in or close to Sinjar Mountain,  which is  the prominent feature of  the
district. The collective towns were constructed 30 to 40 kilometres north or south of
this  location.  In  1976,  the  number  of  houses  built  in  the  11  collectives  of  Sinjar
Mountain amounted to 11,544, i.e.,  1,120 in al-Yarmuk, 1,195 in al-Tamin, 510 in al-
Uruba, 771 in al-Andalus, 1,531 in Huttin, 858 in al-Qadisyia, 907 in al-Walid, 1,300 in al-
Bar, 838 in al-Adnaniya, 1,334 in al-Qahtaniya and 1,180 in al-Jazirah [Dulz 2001: 54-55].
Additionally, 5 neighbourhoods in Sinjar town – Bar Barozh, Saraeye, Kalhey, Burj, and
Barshey  –  were  arabized  in  1975.  The  residents  were  displaced  either  to  collective
towns or other parts of Iraq. In the same year, 413 Muslim and Yezidi Kurdish farmers
were dispossessed of their lands or had their agricultural contracts cancelled and were
replaced by Arab settlers.  In the censuses of  1977 and 1987,  Yezidis  were forced to
register  as  Arabs  and,  since  the  mid-1970s,  speaking  Kurdish  has  been  prohibited.
Finally,  in  the  1990s,  the  distribution  of  land  to  Arab  settlers  was  resumed,  and
continued until the fall of the Baath regime in 2003.9
13 In Sheikhan, a similar process took place: in 1975, 147 out of a total of 182 villages
suffered forced displacement, while 64 villages were handed over to Arab settlers in the
years following. The legal basis for these measures was the Revolutionary Command
Council’s Decree (RCCD) No. 795 from 1975 and the RCCD No. 358 from 1978. The former
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authorized the confiscation of movable and immovable property of members of the
Kurdish National Movement; the latter allowed for the invalidation of property deeds
belonging to displaced Muslim and Yezidi Kurds, the nationalization of their land under
the control of the Ministry of Finance, and resettlement of the region by Arab families.
In the 1977 census, Yezidis and a number of Muslim Kurds were forced to register as
Arabs. Moreover, 7 collective towns were constructed in Sheikhan for the residents of
arabized villages. Finally, in 1988, another 10 villages located in the Aqra sub-district of
Atroush were destroyed.10
14 The beginning of the First Gulf War in January 1991 was followed by a Kurdish uprising
in March, which was violently suppressed by the Iraqi regime. By the end of April, more
than 1.5  million  Kurds,  among them many Yezidis,  crossed  the  border  and  fled  to
Turkey  and  Iran  to  escape  persecution.  As  a  consequence,  “Operation  Provide
Comfort”, carried out by the US and its allies, established a “save haven”, a security
zone  inside  the  Iraqi  state,  including  Dohuk,  Zakho,  and  Amadiya,  to  protect  the
civilian population. Moreover, on April 19th a no-fly zone was established north of the
36th parallel.  Also in April,  the  Iraqi  Kurdistan Front,  grouping Kurdish opposition
parties such as the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan),  and the Iraqi  leadership started to negotiate about the territories to be
included in an autonomous Kurdish region. The Kurdish side demanded the inclusion of
Sheikhan as well as Sinjar; however, in the end, only the northern part of Sheikhan
became part  of  the  region governed by  the  Kurdistan Regional  Government  (KRG),
while the southern part of Sheikhan as well as Sinjar remained under Iraqi control.
Yezidi  places  of  settlement were effectively cut  into two,  with the Valley of  Lalesh
being allotted to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
15 The KDP and the PUK, the parties dominating the KRG, soon started to recognize the
Iraqi  Yezidis  as  a  major  political  factor.11 Since  the  mid-1990s,  protagonists  of  the
Kurdish  National  Movement  acknowledged  Yezidism as  the  original  religion  of  the
Kurds, thus creating the myth of a common pre-Islamic religion. This phenomenon had
a unifying effect on the Kurds, distinguishing their religious origins from those of other
nations in the Middle East and stressing the uniqueness of Kurdish (cultural) identity
[Dulz 2001: 103-106].12 Consequently, encouragement of the Yezidis by Kurdish political
parties has strengthened the Kurdish identity of the Yezidis and their sympathy for
Kurdish nationalism. This is particularly true as, since the fall of the Baath regime in
2003, the persecutions of Yezidis outside the Kurdistan Region ranged from murder,
assassination attempts and violent attacks,  to death threats and public intimidation
campaigns.
16 However,  the  ethnic  identity  of  the  Yezidis  in  Iraq  is  more  disputed  than  Kurdish
parties tend to admit. Shifting identity concepts such as “I used to be an Arab, now it’s
better  to  be  a  Kurd”  and  “I  am  half  Kurdish,  half  Arab”  are  gaining  prevalence.13
According  to  Human Rights  Watch  (2009),  Yezidis  in  the  “disputed  territories”14 of
Sheikhan  and  Sinjar  who  define  themselves  as  Arabs  or  simply  as  Yezidis  risk
persecution by the KRG, as these ethnic definitions question “the right” of  Kurdish
parties to govern these disputed parts of Nineveh.
17 Even in  the  Kurdistan  Region  of  Iraq,  the  relationship  between Yezidi  and  Muslim
Kurds is  more  complex  than  often  described.  The  Yezidi  perception  is  clouded  by
erstwhile persecutions carried out by the Muslim majority.  Yezidis from Dohuk, for
example, define themselves as Kurds. Should the above-mentioned persecution of the
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Yezidis  be  the  topic  of  conversation,  however,  “Kurd”  becomes  synonymous  with
“Muslim” [Spät 2005: 86].
 
Material Aspects of Urbanization
Geography and Statistics
18 The district of Sinjar and the district of Sheikhan are situated in the governorate of
Nineveh. Sinjar lies between Tel Afar in the north-east, al-Baaj in the south-east, and
the Syrian border in the west. Thus, Sinjar is a region cut off from Kurdish territories
and surrounded by Sunni Arab settlements where the insurgency, i.e., radicals of Sunni
Islamist and Baathist provenance, is highly influential.
19 The district of Sheikhan borders on the governorate of Dohuk in the north, the district
of Tel Kaif in the west, the district of Aqra in the east and the sub-district of Bashiqa
(Mosul district) in the south.
20 In 2008, the Nineveh Provincial Council estimated the population of Sinjar at 235,950
and the population of al-Qahtaniya at 72,307. An estimation of the number of Yezidis
and  others  living  in  the  collective  towns  is  not  available.  However,  the  current
population of the two collective towns in the sub-district of al-Qahtaniya – al-Qahtaniya
and al-Jazirah – is estimated to be approximately 58,000.15 This means that about 80% of
the population of al-Qahtaniya live in collective towns.
21 Southern Sheikhan – the region officially governed by Nineveh – has, according to the
Nineveh Provincial Council,  a population of 64,208. The population of the northern,
Kurdish-administered area of Sheikhan is estimated at 68,156 – a figure based on the
food rations  distributed.  Hence,  the  total  population  of  Sheikhan district  stands  at
approximately 132,000.16 Although no precise information is available on the number of
people  currently  living  in  the  collective  towns  of  Sheikhan,  numbers  of  voters
registered for the Iraqi parliamentary elections in March 2010 have been obtained for
some of  the major Yezidi  collective towns.  In Mahat  and the surrounding 6,887,  in
Beban 1,600, in Esyan 2,013, and in Nisiriya and surroundings 2,662 voters were eligible




22 Nineveh is Iraq’s most dangerous governorate and in 2009 Mosul city was the most
violent city of Iraq on a per-capita basis.17 Violence and fighting take place on a daily
basis. In 2007, extremists linked to the al-Qaida network began to retreat to northern
Iraq, particularly to Nineveh,18 where the environment remained favourable for several
reasons.  First  of  all,  the  American “surge”  –  a  new  strategy  against  al-Qaida  that
included the funding of Sunni tribal militias fighting al-Qaida – focused on the regions
of Anbar and Baghdad rather than the North. Secondly, the KDP and the PUK, which
control parts of Nineveh, opposed the emergence of Sunni militias, fearing they might
ultimately become a more potent threat than the existing insurgency. Finally, ethnic
tension  and  Arab  resentment  to  what  was  perceived  as  a  “Kurdish  expansionist
agenda” meant that al-Qaida retained its appeal for large segments of the population.19
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23 The  current  conflict  between  the  KRG  and  the  Provincial  Government  of  Nineveh
centres on the above-defined disputed territories of the governorate. Since 2004 and
particularly after the violent flare-up of sectarianism between Sunni and Shia Arabs in
2006,  the  Kurdish  leadership  has  been  quietly  moving  security  forces  further  into
Nineveh, over which it asserts claims, and has established political and administrative
structures  to  maintain  control.  Sinjar  and  Sheikhan  both  belong  to  territories
controlled by the KRG.
24 In Sinjar, the Iraqi Army 3rd Division, the Iraqi police and Kurdish Peshmerga forces20
(the latter have been in the region since November 2004) are jointly responsible for
security.  The  Peshmerga  mostly  provide  static  security  for  the  collective  towns,21
whereas the Iraqi army is primarily in control of the checkpoints on the main roads.22
Nevertheless, security in Sinjar has deteriorated markedly in recent years, a result of
its geostrategic significance. Since the beginning of 2006 or 2007,23 the self-proclaimed
Islamic  State of  Iraq  –  a  network  linked  to  al-Qaida  –  has  imposed  a  siege  on  the
delivery of food, fuel, and construction materials to Sinjar, because it regards Yezidis as
“unbelievers”.24 Service  deliveries  –  food  rations,  fuel,  and  other  supplies  –  are
provided  by  Dohuk  in  agreement  with  the  Nineveh  Provincial  Council.  However,
according to food distribution agents for the collective town of Tel Banat, almost no
deliveries were made in 2007.25
25 The most devastating attack in post-Saddam Iraq against the Yezidi population, and
against civilians as such, occurred on August 14th 2007 in al-Qahtaniya sub-district, on
the border to Sinjar.  Two Yezidi  collective towns,  al-Qahtaniya and al-Jazirah,  were
attacked by trucks loaded with dynamite, which subsequently detonated,26 killing 326
Yezidis and injuring 530.27 As a result, Peshmerga forces in Sinjar were increased. By
surrounding the collective towns with earthen berms and setting up checkpoints, they
created an effective barrier between Yezidi areas and the Arab settlements.28 While
historically the homogeneous structure of  the villages in Sinjar,  both in ethnic and
religious  terms,  proved a  form of  protection,  the  purely  Yezidi  composition of  the
population in today’s large collective towns makes them an easy target.
26 The overall security situation in Sheikhan is quite different. It is much better than in
other  parts  of  Nineveh  Province,  with  only  a  small  number  of  security  incidents
reported in recent years. As of March 2010, Peshmerga forces are responsible for the
security of the areas south and east of Baadhra, whereas the Iraqi army is present in
the areas west of it. Local police are reported to come from Dohuk, not from Nineveh.
In the past, the administrative staff of the provincial government in Nineveh was more
than once prevented by pro-Kurdish security forces from entering the district.29
 
Economy and Infrastructure
27 Security is not the only urgent problem in Sinjar. The district suffers from a lack of
employment opportunities, a low educational level and persistent poverty. According
to a UNDP study conducted in 2006, overall deprivation in Sinjar is “extreme”, placing
it among the least developed districts in Iraq. The major weaknesses observed are the
lack of education, basic infrastructure and housing, and crowded family circumstances.
Concerning  basic  infrastructure  and  housing,  Sinjar  ranks  among the  five  most
deprived districts in the whole of Iraq.30 The 2008 CFSVA (Comprehensive Food Security
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and Vulnerability Analysis) draws similar conclusions and rates Sinjar as “extremely
vulnerable”.31
28 The infrastructure of the Yezidi collective towns is inadequate and, at best, still weak.
The streets of the collective towns and their feeder roads are not tarred. Most collective
towns  are  without  proper  sewage.  The  greatest  drawback  is  the  lack  of  adequate
supplies of potable water, which has to be delivered by truck. Recent years have seen
no improvement in the infrastructure or health care of the collective towns. United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) describes service delivery to Sinjar and al-
Qahtaniya’s 11 collective towns as “grossly inadequate”,  which is ironic considering
that the improvement in service delivery was the postulated rationale for displacement
in the 1970s.
29 According  to  UNAMI,  the  primary  economic  activities  in  Sinjar  are  subsistence
agriculture  and  livestock  herding,  although  agricultural  land  is  not  serviced  by
irrigation.32 However, the dry climate, a number of years of drought, water shortages,
and poor soil make it impossible for the traditionally large Yezidi families to survive on
agriculture. An additional problem for those families living in the collectives is that
their estates are frequently located at some distance from the collective, close to their
ancestral  villages;  there,  access  is  limited  for  security  reasons.  As  a  consequence,
people in the collective towns have to access other sources of income to address their
economic needs.
30 Sinjari men traditionally leave their home to work as “labour migrants” in the large
urban  centres.  Up  until  mid-2004,  young  Yezidi  men  from  the  collective  towns
migrated to Baghdad or Mosul in search of work, while their families continued to live
in the collective towns.33 However, very few Yezidis now live, for example, in Baghdad.34
Lack of security has forced most of them out of the capital. Moreover, the precarious
security situation also obliged the last of the Yezidi families living in Mosul to seek
refuge in nearby Bashiqa in June 2007.35 Mosul has become a no-go area for Yezidis. As a
result, labourers are now confined to seeking jobs in Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimaniya, as
well as in other cities in the safe, legally KRG-administered region. Male breadwinners
stay away from home for weeks or months on end, since frequent journeys from Sinjar
to the Kurdish North are unaffordable and dangerous.
31 Furthermore, in Sinjar itself, the KRG has developed into a potential economic factor:
jobs in local administration, posts as party officials, and the newly established Yezidi
community  centres  are  highly  welcomed by  most  of  the  inhabitants.  For  countless
impoverished families in the region, Kurdish patronage is the only available source of
income.
32 In Sheikhan, the overall economic situation is rated above average in the ranking of 94
districts by the UNDP 2007 Basic Needs Assessment, while overall deprivation is judged
as moderate.36 Agriculture is the source of most jobs in the district, benefiting not only
from regular  rainfall,  but  also from established systems of  irrigation.37 However,  at
least in the collective towns, the population depends on jobs offered by the KRG. Due to
the comparatively safe security situation, the KRG is in a position to introduce several
measures to improve the infrastructure. It is investing large sums in road construction
and water projects, with a particular focus on the collective towns. Currently, almost
every large collective in Sheikhan has its own auditorium and its own Yezidi cultural
centre. The shrine close to the cemetery in the collective town of Beristek has also been
renovated. Infrastructural projects stretch as far south as the Makhlub Mountain at the
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district border of Tel Kaif. This is a new development, since, prior to 2009, the KRG was
not  as  prominent  as  it  is  today  in  the  region.  Several  small  factories  have  been
established along the road to Ain Sifni. As in Sinjar, the KRG has become an attractive
employer  in  Sheikhan,  providing  jobs  in  the  local  administration,  in  the  party
apparatus, as a Peshmerga and with the Yezidi community centres. Moreover, as it has
become extremely dangerous to travel to Mosul for work, external labour markets are
mostly limited to Ain Sifni, Dohuk, Sulaimaniya and Erbil.
33 So far it has been shown that the collectives of Sheikhan and Sinjar constitute an urban
environment with regard to population density, primary types of economic activity,
and, in Sheikhan more than in Sinjar, settlement categories such as electricity, water
supply, etc. Even those aspects of life in the collectives which seem to be “rural” at first
sight do not prove to be so on further consideration. If having some sheep is already
“rural”, is it still rural if these sheep live between plastic garbage rather than the open
countryside? Breeding bees might be categorized as “rural”, but what if these bees are
fed with industrial food from the local market? These examples clearly show that the
rural/urban  dichotomy  is  highly  artificial.  Therefore,  in  the  next  section,  we  will
examine to what extent urbanization goes beyond such material aspects. What Lewis
Holloway  and  Moya  Kneafsey  state  about  the  rural  context  is  valid  for  the  urban
context as well. It cannot be understood as a clearly identifiable space, or as a verifiable
of  social  or  economic  characteristics,  but  as  a  meaningful  concept,  “discursively
constructed,  understood and related  to  in  different  ways  by  diverse  social  groups”
[2004: 2].
 
Beyond Material Aspects of Urbanization
34 According to the Nineveh Office of the Article 140 Committee, approximately 16,000
compensation claims were filed by both Yezidi and Muslim Kurds seeking to return to
their original villages in Sinjar. About 1,500 of these claims are said to refer to families
displaced from the Nineveh governorate, whereas the majority emanated from families
forcibly  relocated  to  collective  towns  in  Sinjar  and  al-Qahtaniya.  Given  a  total
household size of 5.5 in Sinjar,38 it can be estimated that approximately 80,000 people
currently living in collectives would like to return to their villages.39 However, there is
no  large-scale  village  reconstruction  programme  in  Sinjar  although  such  has  been
called for by the Yezidi Movement. This is primarily due to a lack of security. A second
reason  could  be  Nineveh’s  hitherto  poor  performance  in  terms  of  executing  its
provincial investment budget: as of November 2008, it had contracted no more than
12% of its 2008 budget allocations and disbursed a mere 1% of its overall budget to
contractors. Financing a large-scale village reconstruction programme with funds from
Dohuk, by contrast, would probably have been criticized by Mosul and Baghdad as the
pursuit  of  a  “Kurdish  expansionist  agenda”.  Last  but  not  least,  the  fact  that  the
majority of Arab settlers brought in by the Baath regime from the mid-1970s onwards,
have, unlike in Sheikhan, remained in the region40, and possibly in villages claimed by
displaced Yezidis, could prove problematic.
35 In Sheikhan, the situation is different. Several villages destroyed by the Iraqi military
in the northern and southern areas of Sheikhan have been reconstructed or are in the
process of being reconstructed by the KRG since 1991 and 2003, respectively.41 Prior to
the 2003 invasion, a number of Arab settlers fled the area; the villages of those who
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subsequently attempted to return, but were prevented from doing so, were taken over
by Kurds.42 Former Arab residents of Sheikhan claim that up to 11,000 people were
displaced at that time. The process described was based on the shift in the balance of
power in northern Iraq, not on the implementation of legal reforms: Kurdish returnees
had not re-established their land rights, since the corresponding legislation was not in
place to allow for such redress.43
36 However,  who  exactly  returned  to  the  villages  remains  unclear.  Are  they  former
residents and their offspring who had originally fled to other parts of Iraq or were
deported to collective towns, or are they people who had never lived in the region, but
now  benefited  from  the  new  power  balance  between  the  Kurds  and  the  Arabs?
Moreover, it seems that many Kurds returning only did so temporarily. Indeed, a vast
and permanent movement back to the Yezidi ancestral villages has not occurred, nor is
it expected. Our research in the collectives of Sheikhan shows that the members of the
Yezidi community have opted to improve their living conditions in the collective towns
and  establish  themselves  there  permanently.  Those  who  return  for  economic  or
security reasons to the reconstructed villages are extremely poor. At the same time, the
number of compensation claims from Yezidi and Muslim Kurds living in the collective
towns  of  Sheikhan received  by  the  Nineveh Office  of  the  Article  140  Committee  is
comparably small: approximately 6,000 to 7,000. About 3,000 to 4,000 claims are said to
have come from families  displaced from Nineveh governorate,  while  the remainder
relates  to  families  forcibly  relocated  to  collectives  in  Sheikhan.44 Given  a  total
household  size  of  7.3  in  Sheikhan,45 it  can  be  estimated  that  approximately  25,000
people currently living in the collectives are contemplating a return to their original
villages.  This figure is much smaller than in the case of Sinjar (80,000),  not only in
absolute numbers, but also in relation to the overall population of the two districts.
37 Displacement and village destruction may have affected fewer people in Sheikhan than
in Sinjar. However, another factor seems more important: since the security situation
in Sheikhan is far more stable than in Sinjar, and the KRG has invested heavily in the
infrastructure of the collectives, staying there has become more attractive for Yezidis
than returning to village life;  this is particularly for women, as the aforementioned
infrastructure significantly facilitates their lives. In other words, the Yezidi population
of  Sheikhan might  still  present  itself  as  an originally  rural  population dreaming of
return. However, when people are free to decide if they want to return to the village or
not, they mostly chose to stay in the collective towns. This is very likely to happen in
Sinjar, once infrastructure and security in the collective towns improve. Thus, at least
the majority of the Yezidis in Sheikhan does not only live in an urban environment but
also prefers this life to that in the village. They have been “mentally urbanized”.
38 However, in this regard, the Yezidis of the collectives of Sheikhan and Sinjar are not so
different  from many other  Kurds:  Yezidi  collectives  are  not  the  only  ones  to  have
become permanent. What, then, makes the Yezidi case different from others?
 
Against the Urban Centres of the Kurdistan Region
39 Up to now, and not only under Saddam Hussein, migration has been limited for the
most  part  to  the phenomenon of  commuting.  No mass  migration by Yezidis  to  the
urban centres of the legally Kurdish-administered region has occurred so far. Since the
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1970s, the number of Yezidi families in Erbil, for example, is estimated to be no more
than 10.46 Why?
40 A first possible explanation is quite simple: if the collectives have to be defined – in a
material sense – as desirable urban environment, why then move to the urban centres
of Erbil or Dohuk? Which advantages would be linked to such a change of location?
Indeed, it seems that the disadvantages predominate.
41 Firstly, the large Yezidi families cannot cover the high cost of living in the Kurdish-
administered North.  Housing rents  have  soared there  since  the  US-led  invasion.  In
addition,  Yezidis  from  Sinjar  and  the  centrally  governed  regions  of  Sheikhan  are
prevented  by  the  KRG  administration  from  registering  with  the  PDS  (Public
Distribution System). They are not permitted to transfer their food ration cards from
their place of origin to the legally Kurdish-administered region. Many Yezidi families
depend on PDS food rations  and they are  unable  to  move to  the Kurdistan Region
without.47 This is because the food ration lists are used to produce the voter lists, and
people are only entitled to vote wherever they are registered with their food agent. The
KRG has an interest in seeing as many Kurds – in this case the Yezidis – as possible stay
in disputed territories such as Sinjar in order to vote, at the time of the referendum,48
in favour of Sinjar and other disputed territories being attached to the KRG region.
Consequently,  by hindering them to transfer  their  ration cards  from their  place of
origin, the Yezidis are forced to stay outside the security of the Kurdish-administered
region and to uphold the nationalist claims of Kurdish parties seeking to establish a
“Greater Kurdistan”.49
42 Secondly, in confidential conversations, Yezidis complain of discrimination by Muslim
Kurds in the Kurdish-administered region. Residents of the collective town of Mahat
stated that Muslim Kurds treated them as second-class citizens. Indeed, many Yezidis
in the Kurdish-administered region fill jobs that Muslim Kurds refuse to do because of
their low social prestige, e.g. housekeepers, waiters or cleaners in hotels, restaurants,
and homes. Our observations confirm that workers in the service sector are treated
with disrespect by their superiors. Moreover, Yezidi workers in the construction sector,
for example, are paid less than their Muslim colleagues.50
43 Thirdly,  at  least  in  the  case  of  Sinjar,  language  and  cultural  differences  might  be
reasons not to move to the Kurdish North. The fact that Sinjar is surrounded by Arab
settlements contributed to the success of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Baath regime’s
policy of arabization. The majority of Yezidis in Sinjar speak Arabic today, with Kurdish
more or less relegated to the status of a domestic language. Numerous Arabic words are
used in place of Kurdish terms; as a written language, Arabic takes preference over
Kurdish.51 The private as well as the official language in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
in  contrast,  is  Kurdish,  making  it  difficult  for  Yezidis  from  Sinjar  to  establish
themselves there. At the same time, migration to Arab cities is difficult due to security
considerations.
44 Fourthly,  the  religious  homogeneity  of  the  collective  towns  is  an  important  aspect
facilitating the enforcement – at  least  some aspects –  of  endogamy. Events such as
those  of  2007  in  Bashiqa,  after  a  young  Yezidi  woman  fell  in  love  with  an  Arab
neighbour, converted to Islam, and was subsequently stoned by an angry Yezidi crowd,
are most unlikely to happen in a collective such as Sinjar. In cities like Erbil, the “risk”
to  enter  into  close  contact  with  members  of  other  religious  groups  is  significantly
higher.52
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45 Last but not least,  living in the collective towns means living in the vicinity of  the
numerous Yezidi shrines and the Valley of Lalesh, places of high significance for the
day-to-day practice of Yezidism. Only the presence of a large Yezidi community in the
region can assure the future existence of this “holy landscape”.
 
Effectively Urbanized in the Periphery of the
Collectives
46 Under  Saddam  Hussein,  the  Yezidi  rural  population  of  Sinjar  and  Sheikhan  was
effectively urbanized in the collective towns. This process has neither been revoked
after 1991, nor after 2003. Migration to the urban centres of the Kurdish Region was out
of reach for Yezidis living in both districts, above all for economic reasons. At the same
time, Yezidi and Muslim Kurds in Sheikhan mostly decided against returning to the
villages when they had the option. They prefer work as public servants to earning a
living as small  peasants or shepherds.  Indeed,  with the PDS still  in place and large
amounts of fruits and vegetables being imported from Iran and Turkey, it is difficult to
find a market for agricultural goods.  In Sinjar,  however,  people were not given the
option of returning to their original villages. Until 2003, the district was ruled by the
Baath regime; afterwards, the security situation did not allow a broad resettlement. It
seems that many Yezidis still  nourish the dream of return. Yet,  this dream is most
likely to vanish and give place to a similar process as that which occurred in Sheikhan
once the security situation and the infrastructure in the collective towns will  have
improved.
47 Economic and political dependency on Dohuk or Erbil, respectively, is one of the most
characteristic  features  of  the  collectives.  It  has  been  shown,  for  example,  that  job
opportunities  are  created  and  allocated  above  all  by  the  KRG.  The  collectives  may
therefore  be  well  characterized by  the  term “peripheral  area”,  defined as  a  region
significantly characterized by unequal power relations to a centre [Beetz 2008]. Still, in
this regard, life in the collectives does not differ much from that in many parts of the
Kurdistan Region. At the same time, at least the collectives in Sheikhan some combine
positive aspects of “urban” life (electricity, water, sewage) with the advantages of the
former  Yezidi  villages  (ethnical  and  religious  homogeneity,  location  in  the  “holy
landscape”). Therefore, urbanization in the collectives has not only been as effective as
it was because of the use of force and a lack of other alternatives, but also because it
offers – and did offer – very specific advantages for the deported Yezidi population.
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NOTES
1. Irene Dulz conducted research on the Yezidis in Iraq from August 2004 to December
2005, in May and June 2006, and from December 2009 to January 2010. Eva Savelsberg
and Siamend Hajo carried out research on Iraqi Yezidis in August 2002, September 2006
and October-November 2007.
2. “Sinjar” is the official Arab expression. The Kurdish term “Shingal” is more familiar
to Yezidis. 
3. Strictly speaking, Sheikhan consists of two districts: Sheikhan and al-Sheikhan. See
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa”.
Middle East Report No. 90, 28 September 2009, p. 30. 
4. However, there was no specific objective to target the Yezidis, but they were swept
up in the anti-Kurdish campaign.
5. See  also  UNAMI (United Nations  Assistance Mission for  Iraq),  “Disputed Internal
Boundaries:  Sinjar district”,  Volume  1,  2009, p. 2,  and  UNAMI,  “Disputed  Internal
Boundaries: Sheikhan district”, Volume 1, 2009, p. 2. 
6. None of the authors have been able to visit Sinjar since 2005.
7. Whereas a number of Yezidis are of the opinion that Sheikh Adi started integrating
Islamic elements into “pure” Yezidism [Spät 2005: 39-40]. 
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8. See ICG, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa”. Middle East Report No.
90, 28 September 2009, p. 31. 
9. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 1-3. 
10. See  UNAMI,  “Disputed  Internal  Boundaries:  Sheikhan  district”,  Volume  1,
2009, pp. 2-3. The scale of Kurdish displacement in the North during the mid-1970s was
not confined to the Sheikhan and Sinjar regions, but covered an area stretching from
Khanaqin town close to the Iranian border to the Syrian and Turkish border regions
around Sinjar. Moreover, it was followed by the Anfal campaign of 1988, during which
the Iraqi government destroyed between 3,000 and 4,000 Kurdish villages and towns,
displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Some of them were settled in collective
towns, others deported to Southern Iraq. Many fled abroad, above all to Iran. About
100,000 people “disappeared”. The genocidal character of the Anfal campaign made it
radically different to earlier and later arabization campaigns. 
11. For more on KRG policies towards Yezidis, see I.  Dulz, S. Hajo and E. Savelsberg
[2004-2005: 102-107; 2009: 43-52].
12. Compare J. Tejel Gorgas [2004-2005] on early attempts, especially of the Bedir Khan
brothers,  to  co-opt  the  Yezidis  into  the  “Kurdish  National  Project”  or  to  describe
Zoroastrianism as the predecessor of Yezidism and the original religion of all Kurds.
13. The  discussion  on  the  ethnic  affiliation  of  the  Yezidis  is  not  new.  Sheikh  Adi,
originally from the Bekaa Plateau in Lebanon, was an Arab and has been declared as
such  by  the  Yezidis.  Arab  ethnicity  applies  to  members  of  the  Yezidi  sheikh  class
because they derive from the lineage of Sheikh Adi.
14. Disputed territories are those territories claimed by the KRG, but not covered by
Article  53  of  the  Transitional  Administrative  Law,  later  incorporated  into  the
Constitution by Article 140. This article stipulates that the KRG is legally responsible for
governing the territories controlled by KDP and PUK on March 19, 2003, when US-led
troops invaded Iraq. These territories are comprised of parts of the governorates of
Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh. However, in the case of Nineveh
– and not only here – the KRG asserts its right to regions that extend way beyond this
line. In the west of the governorate it claims Zummar, a sub-district of Tel Afar, as well
as the whole of Sinjar (to which it  wants to attach the sub-district of al-Qahtaniya,
which has belonged to the neighbouring al-Baaj district since 1977). In the North, the
KRG seeks control of the districts of Tel Kaif and Aqra; only the latter is covered by
Article  53.  In  the  east  of  Nineveh  governorate,  it  demands  the  incorporation  of
Sheikhan and al-Hamdaniya districts; again, only some areas of these districts (the sub-
districts  of  Baadhra,  Atroush,  Qasrouq  and  Eski  Kalak)  are  covered  by  Article  53.
Finally, Bashiqa, a sub-district of Mosul, is to be incorporated into the KRG region. See
ICG, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa”. Middle East Report No. 90, 28
September 2009, p. 17. The KRG justifies its claim to these regions by arguing that, prior
to arabization, they were entirely or predominantly Kurdish. 
15. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 1-2. 
16. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sheikhan district”, Volume 1, 2009, p. 1. 
17. See http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/ 2009/
18. The other northern governorate to be affected by this insurgent retreat was Kirkuk.
19. ICG, “Iraq after the Surge”. Volume 1: “The New Sunni Landscape”. Middle East
Report No. 74, 30 April 2008, p. 8. 
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20. The “Peshmerga” literally means “those who face death”. 
21. The Arab residents of Sinjar claim that the Peshmerga prevent them from entering
the collective towns and consequently deny them access to schools, health clinics and
other governmental services located in the collectives.
22. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 17-18. 
23. The source quoted here, the UNAMI report, gives inconsistent information on the
date.
24. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 3 and
17. 
25. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, p. 7. 
29. See  HRW,  “On  Vulnerable  Ground.  Violence  against  Minority  Communities  in
Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territories”. November 2009, p. 19. See also ICG, “Iraq’s
New Battlefront: The Struggle over Ninewa”. Middle East Report No. 90, 28 September
2009, p. 19. 
30. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 14-15. 
31. As the study is conducted at district level, no figures are available for the al-Baaj
sub-district  al-Qahtaniya.  See  UNWFP  (United  Nations  World  Food  Programme),
“Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq”, 2008, p. 187. 
32. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 14 and
21. 
33. Interview with Mamou Othman, Director General, Presidential Diwan of Kurdistan
Region, Hamburg, Germany, 13 August 2007. Interview with Khidir Domle, journalist,
Dohuk, Iraq, October 2004.
34. Interview  with  Said  Silo,  President  of  the  Lalesh  Cultural  Centre,  Dohuk,  Iraq,
November 2007.
35. Interview with Lazgin al-Barany, a Yezidi from Mosul, Damascus, Syria, June 2007.
36. See  UNAMI,  “Disputed  Internal  Boundaries:  Sheikhan  district”,  Volume  1,
2009, p. 10. See also UNWFP, “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
in Iraq”, 2008, pp. 128 and 187. 
37. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sheikhan district”, Volume 1, 2009, p. 9. 
38. UNWFP,  “Comprehensive  Food  Security  and  Vulnerability  Analysis  in  Iraq”,
2008, p. 182. 
39. According to the PUK, families from 11 villages have already left the collective town
of al-Qahtaniya and returned to their ancestral homes. See UNAMI, “Disputed Internal
Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, p. 16. 
40. UNAMI, “Disputed Internal Boundaries: Sinjar district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 9, 14
and 16. 
41. A number of Yezidis and Christians privately claim that the construction of Yezidi
and  Christian  villages  destroyed  during  the  arabization  campaign  proceeded  much
more slowly than the rebuilding of  Muslim Kurdish villages.  See UNAMI,  “Disputed
Internal Boundaries: Sheikhan district”, Volume 1, 2009, pp. 12-13. 
42. HRW, “Claims in Conflict.  Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in northern Iraq”,  August
2004, Volume 16, No. 4, pp. 27-29. 
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43. The  difficulties  associated  with  RCCD  No.  358  of  1978,  which  refers  to  the
nationalization of  Kurdish land,  are ongoing:  while  the KRG was able  to cancel  the
effects of this decree for the sub-districts of Atroush, Qasrouq and Baadhra, it has no
legal jurisdiction over the southern sub-districts. Land in this region is still owned by
the state.  Hence,  the  original  owners  who returned to  their  estates  are  not  legally
entitled  to  them.  See  UNAMI,  “Disputed  Internal  Boundaries:  Sheikhan  district”,
Volume 1, 2009, p. 12. See also HRW, “Claims in Conflict. Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in
northern Iraq”, August 2004, Volume 16, No. 4, p. 34. 
44. See  UNAMI,  “Disputed  Internal  Boundaries:  Sheikhan  district”,  Volume  1,
2009, p. 13. 
45. UNWFP,  “Comprehensive  Food  Security  and  Vulnerability  Analysis  in  Iraq”,
2008, pp. 119 and 182. 
46. Interview with Yezidi residents in Erbil, Iraq, December 2009.
47. Interview  with  Said  Silo,  President  of  the  Lalesh  Cultural  Centre,  Dohuk,  Iraq,
November 2007.
48. The referendum on the future of the “disputed territories” scheduled for 2005 has
been  postponed  several  times.  It  is  still  not  clear  whether,  and  if  so  when,  the
referendum is to be carried out. In April 2009, UNAMI presented a detailed study of the
disputed  territories  to  Iraqi  stakeholders.  However,  the  proposals  were  officially
rejected on both sides and not used for further discussions of the opponents. See ICG,
“Iraq’s  New Battlefront:  The  Struggle  over  Ninewa”.  Middle  East  Report  No.  90,  28
September 2009, p. 19. 
49. The  described  procedure  is  similar  to  how  the  KDP  and  the  PUK  dealt  with
internally displaced persons from Kirkuk. In the wake of their displacement they lived
in  camps  in  the  Kurdish-administered  North  under  miserable  conditions,  as  their
integration was not planned [Hajo and Savelsberg 2002]. Following the regime change
in 2003, some were subsequently “motivated” by food ration distribution to move to
Kirkuk and functioned as demographic support for the Kurdish claim to the city. For
other strategies to persuade people to move to Kirkuk, see ICG, “Iraq and the Kurds:
Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis”. Middle East Report No. 64, 19 April 2007, p. 4. 
50. See http://www.avestakurd.net/news_detail.php?id= 8291
52. Of course the “risk” that members of different casts fall in love with each other can
not be banned by staying in the collectives. 
RÉSUMÉS
Résumé :
Cet  article  présente  les  principales  caractéristiques du  yézidisme  ainsi  que  les  relations
historiques entre, d’une part, la communauté yézidie et l’État irakien et, d’autre part, les Yézidis
et les Kurdes musulmans. Ces relations sont marquées par des persécutions, des déplacements de
populations rurales et des destructions de villages. Qu’en est-il des villes de Sheikhan et Sinjar ?
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On a ici affaire à un environnement urbain pour ce qui est de la densité de la population, des
activités économiques et, à Sheikhan plus qu’à Sinjar, de la fourniture d’électricité et d’eau. De
surcroît, dans ces villes, la population a été « mentalement urbanisée ». La majorité des Yézidis
de Sheikhan préfèrent la vie urbaine à la vie villageoise. Les communautés yézidies ne sont pas
les seules en Irak à s’être implantées de façon définitive. On expliquera en quoi leur cas diffère de
celui d’autres communautés.
The main features of Yezidism are described as well as the historical relations between, on the
one hand, the Yezidi community and the Iraqi state, and, on the other hand, Yezidi and Muslim
Kurds.  Persecution, the displacement of rural populations and the destruction of villages has
characterized these relations. What is the current situation in the towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar?
This is an urban environment as regards population density, economic activities and, in Sheikhan
more than in Sinjar, settlement facilities such as electricity or the water supply. Furthermore,
the population in these towns has also been “mentally urbanized”. The majority of the Yezidis in
Sheikhan  not  only  live  in  an  urban  environment  but  prefer  this  to  village  life.  The  Yezidi
communities are not the only ones in Iraq that have become permanent. This article seeks to
explain how this case differs from the others.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Nord de l’Irak, déplacements de populations rurales, destructions de villages,
urbanisation, communauté yézidie, Sheikhan, Sinjar
Keywords : destruction of villages, Northern Irak, displacement of rural population, Sheikhan,
urbanisation, Yezidis, Sinjar
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